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Abstract
How does the entrance of radical candidates influence election
results? Conventional wisdom suggests that extreme candidates merely split
the votes. Based on the range effect theory in cognitive psychology, we
hypothesize that the entrance of an extreme candidate reframes the
endpoints of the ideological spectrum among available candidates, which
makes the moderate one on the same side to be perceived by the voters as
even more moderate. Through two survey experiments in the United States
and Taiwan, we provide empirical support for range effect in the vote choice
in the plurality system. The results imply that a mainstream party can, even
without changing its own manifesto, benefit from the entrance of its radical
counterpart; it explains why the mainstream party may choose cooperation
strategically. Our findings also challenge the assumption in regression
models that the perceived ideological positions of candidates are
independent of each other.

Keywords Extreme Candidate, Range Effect, Extremeness Aversion, Survey
Experiment, Taiwan Politics

Introductioni
The emergence of radical wing candidates in electoral races has become a global
phenomenon in recent times.ii For example, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the
United Kingdom, National Front (FN) in France, and the China Unification Promotion
Party in Taiwan all evidenced the extension of existing ideological spectrums in each
country (For review, see Kitschelt and McCann 2005, or Mair 2007). This study
investigates the effects of extreme candidates’ appearance in electoral contests, especially
regarding how they influence supporters of the mainstream parties.
Traditional theories of voting behavior suggest that people vote for candidates who
are closer to themselves on the ideological spectrum. According to the spatial models, the
entrance of extreme left or right wing candidates into electoral races does nothing more
than splitting the vote from their moderate counterparts. For instance, many people still
blame Ralph Nader as the spoiler candidate who caused Al Gore’s defeat to George W.
Bush in the 2000 presidential election (Herron and Lewis 2007).
However, mainstream parties’ reactions vary considerably to the entrance of extreme
candidates. Some mainstream parties diverge from the median point to prevent the entry of
a new party (Palfrey 1984). After all, it is easier for mainstream parties to appease and to
absorb newcomers, for example by including candidates with diverse backgrounds in the
party list or providing more credible promises. On the contrary, other mainstream parties
do not necessarily try to block those radical competitors on the same side of the political
spectrum. Are these radical wing candidates harmful or beneficent to the mainstream
parties, especially to those on the same side?
Studies of cognitive psychology indicate that individuals’ preference is contextdependent, primarily influenced by the range of options (Parducci 1965). While the stimuli

— a new option — becomes available, individuals will re-access the end values first, and
accordingly evaluate the stimuli as well as the existing options. The range effect has been
found in various fields such as psychophysics (Laberge and Brown 1986) and marketing
(Simonson and Tversky 1992).
With the rise of the extreme parties and candidates in the recent decades, the range
effect also draws attention to political scientists. Simonovits (2017) shows that the
appearance of non-moderate policy options reshapes the subject’s preferences among the
existing policies. Furthermore, Waismel-Manor and Simonovits (2017) find that, in the
context of Israeli general election, voters consider the full spectrum of candidates and
parties in the competition, while the entrance of radical candidates will change the
respondents’ perception on the existing actors.
Our study continues to answer several essential puzzles regarding range effect and
voting behavior. Importantly, we examine whether the range effect appears in different
institutional contexts. We propose to study the range effect in another essential and
generalizable setting: the two-party system in the single-member-district (SMD).
Intuitively, the competition in SMD is similar to the original study of range effect and many
other related experiments: two main rivals and a third incoming competitor. Therefore,
testing the range effect theory in a two-party system does not need extra assumptions such
as the number of existing competitors in the Israeli case in Waismel-Manor and Simonovits
(2017).
By conducting survey experiment in two countries with similar electoral and party
systems, the United States and Taiwan, we show that the entrance of a politically radical
candidate can be, contrary to conventional wisdom, beneficial to their mainstream

counterpart in specific scenarios. Even though an extreme candidate may split votes among
radical supporters, their entrance into an electoral contest also stimulates “extremeness
aversion effect” (Simonson and Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993) among the
moderate voters, which may increase the vote share of the mainstream candidate on the
same side.
Our empirical results challenges (again) the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) assumption implicitly acknowledged in the spatial models and multinomial
regression models. Besides, the results also reveal a possible strategy that a major party
prefer: cognitively changing voters’ perception toward it without changing its policy stance
practically.

Range Effect, Extremeness Aversion, and Spatial Voting
When making choices, individuals’ preferences are contextual-dependent. People
do not evaluate each option independently nor assign constant utility to each of them.
Instead, people often make comparisons among the available options in the choice set,
which is called range effect (Parducci 1965). Based on this cognitive psychological
mechanism, studies in various fields have shown that the range effects do exist (e.g.,
Laberge and Brown 1986; Yeung and Soman 2005).
In many cases, individuals tend to make extremeness-averse choices: when a third
extreme choice becomes the new endpoint on one side, subjects re-evaluate the existing
option at the same side as more moderate (Simonson and Tversky 1992). It is worth
noticing that this influence is asymmetric - the new extreme option would influence only
the moderate option on the same side, but not the other one which is still the other endpoint
of the spectrum.

We argue that the similar psychological mechanism can be found when voters are
evaluating among candidates, especially under SMD. SMD is closer to the experimental
settings in the psychology literature than that is in PR. When a radical left or right wing
candidate or party decides to run in the election and challenge the existing two-party
competition, it resets the new reference point for the ideological spectrum among options
already on the ballot. When comparing three candidates, the extreme candidate anchors
voters’ attitude formation process. Since the extreme candidate and the moderate candidate
on the opposite side become the two new endpoints, voters would consider the moderate
candidate on the same side of the political spectrum as the extreme candidate as more
moderate. Likewise, the entrance of an extreme candidate would not influence voters’
evaluation on the mainstream opponent since the mainstream opponent is still one of the
endpoints among available options before and after the entrance of the radical candidate.
Following the similar logic of spatial voting, the subjective perception shift would increase
the vote share of this intermediate option among the moderate voters but decrease among
the radical voters on the same side of the political spectrum.iii
Indeed, the range effect has been found in recent political science studies.
Simonovits (2017) designed six survey experiments and asked respondents to evaluate
immigration, welfare, abortion, and minimum wage policies. By introducing the extreme
alternatives, Simonovits shows that respondents tend to perceive the moderate policy on
the same side as much more moderate. Waismel-Manor and Simonovits (2017) also find a
similar effect in Israel politics. When respondents are asked to evaluate the ideological
stance of potential prime minister candidates in 2009 and 2015, whether an extreme
candidate is asked to be evaluated in the same task will impact on how the respondents

evaluate other moderate candidates. To be specific, a moderate prime minister candidate
will be viewed as more centrist when an extreme candidate enters the task and appears next
to the moderate one.
In this article, our first extension is to put the treatments into another realistic setting
– candidate bulletin in congressional elections. All policies are carried by a partisan
candidate, and respondents are asked to evaluate the candidates’ overall stance.
Second, Israel applies PR system with ten parties participated in 2015 general
election. The real politics in Israel is more complicated than the experimental setting in
which it must simplify the total number of parties and candidates in the races, issue
dimensions. The experiment also implicitly assume that people make voting decision
mainly based on the ideological stance of party leaders. At the end of their research,
Waismel-Manor and Simonovits also mentions that “…the recent developments in
majoritarian systems…suggests that contextual effects are not limited to proportional
systems with many parties.” Our study can further extend the study of range effect in
another essential institutional setting.
Admittedly, the radical challenger is less likely to rise and challenge the mainstream
party under SMD. Duverger’s Law indicates that people tend to avoid wasting their votes
on small parties that have little hope to win. However, various successful radical
newcomers challenge the conventional wisdom. For example, in Taiwan, UK, and the
primary elections in the United States, radical wing candidates rapidly emerge, and some
even acquire seats in different levels of elections. Therefore, it is essential to explore the
causal mechanisms behind the phenomenon: how the range effect influences the dynamics
between the mainstream and radical candidates.

Our third extension is to capture the range effect beyond the traditional left-right
spectrum. As we have argued, if such psychological effect exists in the political arena, it
should also appear in the place where other issue dimensions dominate.

Case Selection
To examine the range effect in the political arena, we designed two survey
experiments in two democracies embedded in two distinct political cultures: the United
States and Taiwan. Taiwan and the United States both have presidential elections and firstpast-the-post voting for the heads of local governments as well as district-level national
legislators. These shared characteristics may provide us with the opportunity to examine
and compare the generalizability of our findings.
Our first experiment was conducted in the United States concerning the liberalconservative spectrum. Since the US had a well-developed bipartisan system and SMD
rule, it fits our theoretical requirement. Besides, the primary political spectrum in the
United States has been constructed along with the liberal-conservative spectrum in recent
decades (Poole and Rosenthal 2001; McCarty et al. 2005). However, some studies using
American subjects in cross-sectional surveys find a weak range effect because there can be,
to some extent, multiple policy issues present in each presidential election (see, e.g., Herne
1997; Mebane Jr. and Waismel-Manor 2005). Some researchers argue that the multidimensional competition influenced people’s judgment on the extremeness of the
candidates. Still other studies also directly challenged the assumption of the singledimensionality in the United States (e.g., Feldman and Johnston 2014).
Since the range effect theory is based on available options in the choice set, our
experimental design would better follow the unidimensional setting. Even though the

unidimensional design may not capture the full picture of what people think, Bafumi and
Shapiro (2009) found that the self-reported liberal-conservative ideology performs
relatively well on explaining vote choice and other policy preferences in the U.S. context,
especially in recent years.
That is also why we chose Taiwan as a comparable case – the issue dimension in
the Taiwan election is much more clear and consistent. In Taiwan, people’s preference on
future national status—the unification-independence division, or more directly, the
attitudes toward China—has been the central divide of Taiwanese politics for decades. The
division dominates all other policy debates and outweighs any discussion regarding social
justice or economic development (e.g., Achen and Wang 2017). Taiwanese voters only
access candidates on a single spectrum concerning the unification-independence issue.
At the same time, the political context and the recent development in Taiwan
politics make Taiwan an even better case to test the range effect in real politics. In 2012
Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections, Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP
hereafter) presidential candidate Tsai Ing-Wen asked DPP supporters to “share some votes”
in the concurrent legislative election with the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU hereafter),
the extreme pro-independence party in Taiwan. It seemed irrational for DPP to make such
decision since DPP can absorb all of the votes on the pro-independence side. Since DPP
had not possessed the majority in the Congress in 2012, seat maximization would be the
most rational strategy. TSU turned out to collected 9% of votes and three proportional
representation seats in the legislative election and became the third largest party in 2012.
Tsai was defeated by the incumbent Ma Ying-Jeou from the Kuomintang (KMT hereafter).
It is believed that Tsai’s loss could be attributed to people’s perception of her pro-

independence attitude on the cross-strait relationship with China, even though she claimed
that she espoused the moderate position (Sullivan 2013).
In 2016 presidential and legislative elections, DPP cooperated closely with another
extreme pro-independence party, the New Power Party (NPP) - which has emerged after
the Sunflower Movement in 2014 - to run in the legislative election in some single-member
districts (Hickey and Niou 2017). Besides, in some districts, both DPP and other small
parties with similar pro-independence preference nominated their own candidates,
respectively; but Tsai did not openly criticize these potential conflicts (Fell 2016).
Tsai ran again in the 2016 presidential election. Compared to her previous run, her
stance on cross-strait relationship remains unchanged in a substantive sense; that is, she
tries to move toward the median and preserve the "status quo" in the cross-Strait relations,
which is close to KMT’s position. However, according to the Taiwan National Security
Survey conducted in 2015 by the Duke University Program of Asian Security Studies, iv
65.3% of Taiwanese people believed that the tension between China and Taiwan would
not rise even if Tsai and DPP win the 2016 elections. Compared to perceptions from
previous years, Taiwanese people believed DPP as more moderate in 2016. In this case,
range effect may help explain the DPP’s strategy and Tsai’s eventual electoral victory.
One may question that the focus on candidates and parties is not identical.v Indeed,
our two experiments are candidate-centered, which is the typical scenario in SMD.
However, the policy stance and campaign of a party are usually determined by the party
leader or caucus, especially when there is a concurrent election (Taiwan started to hold the
presidential and legislative election concurrently since 2012). Even though we test the
range effect at district-level, we argue that the party leaders would consider how the policy

stance of their party will influence their vote share across the districts in general. In other
words, range effect in the district may be accumulated and influential to the national
politics.

Research Design and Data Collection
Survey experiment is needed for clarifying causal relationships between range
effect and voting behaviors. If we analyzed the election results by ad hoc surveys, it would
be difficult to identify how the mainstream parties and their smaller counterparts interact
with each other. To be specific, the major party may actively shift toward the center and
suffered the blame for inconsistency before the entrance of a politically extreme party. Also,
the new parties may try their best to create new issue dimension (Meguid 2015) which stirs
the one-dimensional competition dominated by the two mainstream parties. Furthermore,
people would perceive radical candidates (or parties) differently based on their position on
the ideological spectrum, which weakens our examination in a theoretical perspective. For
example, there are continuing debates whether Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan are extreme
candidates or not (e.g., Herron and Lewis 2007; Magee 2003). Hence, an experimental
design is helpful on clarifying the mechanism.
US subjects, MTurk, and the Congressional Election
To deal with these empirical challenges, we designed two survey experiments. One
experiment was conducted through Amazon MTurk on July 15-20, 2016. Subjects need to
be over the age of 18, using a US IP address and have a 95% approval rating or higher for
previous hits. Subjects were invited to participate in a survey related to politics and lifestyle
and would receive $1.25 after completion. Overall, 509 subjects were recruited through
Amazon MTurk, even though in our announcement we only asked for 500. Table 1 shows
the socio-demographic background of the Mturkers in the first experiment. Generally

speaking, the MTurkers we recruited are young, highly educated, non-black, and proliberal. Before the treatments, subjects were asked to locate their ideological position on a
0 to 100 scale from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (100). Therefore, their
self-report position was not influenced by our research treatments.

[Table 1]

Subjects were firstly asked to report their routine political behaviors including news
consumption, political interest, and political discussion. Before the treatment, they were
asked to locate their ideology on a 0 to 100 liberal-conservative scale. After asking
participants to self-report ideology, we put an attention check item before the primary
treatment to filter out inattentive subjects. The item apprantly asks subjects to report their
mood, but actually requires them to select "none of the above" in the last sentences of the
item description. This method is proven to successfully increase the quality of data and
enhance the attention of subjects on Internet surveys (Oppenheimer et al. 2009; Berinsky
et al. 2014). Overall, 499 (98.03%) of our 509 subjects passed the attention check, and
those who failed (10, 1.97%) were dropped from the analysis.
Subjects were then randomly assigned into three different groups. In the Control
Group (n=100), they were asked to read the candidate bulletin of one Congressional
election including one Democratic and one Republican candidate (See the supplemental
material file). The Democratic Party and Republican Party are the two major parties
dominating U.S. politics and are respectively seen as representing a liberal and
conservative ideological stance. On the bulletin, each candidate had three policy statements

created by the researchers. For the Democratic candidate, his statement included
progressive tax, minimum wage, and gay rights. For the Republican candidate, his
statement included abortion only for rape, tax cuts, and lower regulation on businesses.
The policies of all candidates we used in the U.S. experiment were generated from
a pilot survey from 58 political science undergraduate students. Students were asked
through open questions to nominate one policy they would describe as "extremely liberal,"
"moderate liberal," "extremely conservative," and "moderate conservative," respectively.
Students received course credits after completion. The policies nominated more than ten
times by students in each category were selected as candidates’ policy statements. Since
we wanted to enhance the external validity of our experiment, wordings of the policies are
extracted from speeches that politicians made or policy statements that were announced on
candidates’ official websites.
Apart from party and policies, candidate’s name, age, level of education, photo, and
ballot position were all randomized. All candidates were middle-aged white males; in the
2014 election cycle, 75% of all candidates running for office were male, and 82% were
white.
In Treatment Group A (n=200), the bulletin includes three candidates: Republican,
Democratic, and Independent. The extreme conservative (Ext-Con) independent
candidate’s three policy statements included relaxing gun ownership, free market on
health-care, and ending abortion. In Treatment Group B (n=198), the extreme-liberal (ExtLib) independent candidate supported universal single-payer health care, free tuition to all
college students, and women’s full right to reproductive choice. Wordings of the extreme
candidates’ policy statements are extracted from the Libertarian Party and the Green Party

in the U.S., respectively. Subjects in control and treatment groups were then asked to judge
the liberal-conservative positions of the two or three candidates on a 0-100 liberalconservative scale. Their vote choice among the candidates was also asked.
After the treatment, subjects were then asked to report their party identification,
political participation, belief in democracy, and previous experience on political
engagement for other research propose. In the end, subjects were asked about their gender,
age, race, the level of education, and household income. We do not expect the treatments
would influence one’s report on its previous political behaviors or demographic
background because the question is related to experience or fact instead of attitude. These
variables were then used for the randomization check and covariate adjustment. After the
survey, all subjects were debriefed that the assigned candidate bulletin was entirely made
up by researchers.
Taiwan subjects, PTT, and the Legislative Elections
To examine the external validity of range effect, our research design in the second
survey experiment in Taiwan is almost parallel to the former one. This survey experiment
was conducted on March 19-31, 2016, two months after its presidential election. The
recruitment ads were posted on PTT Bulletin Board System, the biggest online discussion
forum in Taiwan.vi Subject needed to be over 18 and living in Taiwan. Subjects were
invited to participate in a survey related to politics and lifestyle, and would join the lottery
for 30 convenience store gift cards valued NTD $100 (about USD $3) after completion.
Overall 427 subjects were recruited on PTT. Table 2 shows the socio-demographic
background of respondents in the second experiment. As is discussed above, the majority
of our Taiwanese respondents are young, highly educated, and self-reported proindependence before the treatment.

[Table 2]

Subjects were first asked to report their routine political behaviors including news
consumption, political interest, and political discussion. They were then requested to
evaluate their attitude toward independence-unification on a 0-100 scale in which 0 means
pro-unification, and 100 means pro-independence. Again, we put an attention check item
before the main treatment to filter out inattentive subjects. Subjects who failed to answer
this item correctly (17 in 427, 3.98%) were dropped from further analysis.
After the attention check, subjects were randomly assigned into three different
groups. In Control Group, subjects were asked to read an election bulletin of legislative
election including a KMT and a DPP candidate (see the supplemental materials file). All
candidates were male, around 50 years old, and with an average bachelor degree. Each
candidate enumerates four policy statements: the former two are related to reform the longterm care health system and housing prices, and the latter two are related to their attitude
toward the cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China - the only dominant issue
in Taiwan. Once again, wordings of the policies were copied from real election bulletins
in Taiwan. The KMT candidate is designed to express a moderate pro-unification attitude,
while the DPP candidate is designed to express a moderate pro-independence attitude.
Subjects in Control Group were asked to read through this electoral bulletin, and use the
same 0-100 scale to locate the perceived ideological position of these two candidates.
Respondents were also asked about their vote choice between these two candidates.
In Treatment Group A, an extreme pro-independence candidate from the TSU was
added to the bulletin. His socio-demographic background and social welfare policies are

similar to the two moderate candidates, but his cross-strait policies include rejecting
interaction with China and immediately initiating constitutional reform to acquire de jure
Taiwan independence. In Treatment Group B, in contrast, an extreme pro-unification
candidate from the New Party (NP) is added. His cross-strait policies are about
reunification with China and repressing the voice of independence. Wordings of these
policy statements usually appear during the campaign process as well as in online political
discussion. Subjects in Treatment Group A and B were also asked to locate the three
candidates on the 0-100 scale, and about their vote choice. After the treatment, all subjects
were asked to report their socio-demographic background and were debriefed after
completion.

Data Analysis
Study 1: US Sample and Liberal-Conservative Spectrum
Before comparing among control and treatment groups, randomization check is
used to ensure the comparability. ANOVA test shows that there is no difference among
subjects in the three groups on their age (p = 0.87), gender (p = 0.64), educational level (p
= 0.20), race (p = 0.56), income (p = 0.77), importance of religion (p=0.13), and selfreported ideology position (p = 0.96). To sum up, we can simply compare the group means
to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE). To improve the precision of estimation and
conduct covariance adjustment given the large size in our sample, we follow the
suggestions given by Freedman (2008) and Lin (2013). We use regression adjustment,
which includes demeaned covariates and their interactions with the two treatment dummies,
which yields unbiased estimation but improves precision asymptotically. All of the
analyses below are calculated and plotted by R 3.1.3, and all codes and data will be publicly
replicable on the author’s website.

Figure 1 shows how US subjects in each group locate the two or three candidates’
ideological position after reading the election bulletin. The distributions are the density
plot, while the dashed lines are the median value since the distributions are skewed. First
of all, in the control group, subjects perceived the two candidates are located in 20 and 81,
respectively. Their judgment is based on the policy statements of the candidates. In
Treatment Group A, the extreme conservative candidate is scored 95 as its median, while
in Treatment group B the extreme liberal candidate was scored 17. The distributions and
the medians provide confidence on the internal validity of the treatments.

[Figure 1]

Figure 1 illustrates the range effect in the politics. Comparing the control group in
the first row and the Treatment Group A, subjects’ perceived ideological position of the
moderate conservative (Republican) candidate changed from 81 to 71, which is more
moderate. Two sample t-test shows that the change in means of the moderate conservative
candidate is significant (p <0.001). Meanwhile, the subject’s perceived policy position of
the moderate liberal (Democratic) candidate remains unchanged (20 to 20, p = 0.49). The
same pattern, albeit insignificant, can be found when comparing the control and Treatment
group B. The entrance of the extreme liberal candidate makes subjects’ attitudes toward
the moderate liberal one more moderate, albeit not statistically significant (from 20 to 23,
p = 0.51; the difference is nearly significant between Treatment Group A and B, from 20
to 23, p = 0.12). At the same time, the subject’s attitude toward the moderate conservative
candidate remains unchanged (81 to 84, p = 0.83).

To adjust for possible randomization failure from covariates including respondents’
socio-demographic background, and owing to the boundary of the scale (0 to 100), we use
Tobit regression to estimate the ATE of the entrance of extreme liberal and conservative
candidate.vii In Table 3, the first and the fourth model estimate how the Ext-Lib and ExtCon influences subjects’ perceived policy position regarding the moderate liberal and
conservative candidate, respectively. In the second, third, fifth, and sixth model, we apply
covariance adjustment by adding the interaction term between the two treatments and the
demeaned age, gender, educational level, income, race, the importance of religion, and selfreported ideology (before treatment). Also, the third and sixth model only use moderate
subjects, which is defined by those who self-reported ideology is relatively moderate between 40 and 60 - which accounts for 20.9% of our MTurk samples.viii

[Table 3]

The result, generally speaking, is consistent with Figure 1 and supports the range
effect theory. The entrance of the extreme conservative candidate Ext-Con would make
voters view the Mod-Con candidate as more moderate. The average treatment effect is
about -7.3 for all participants, and -18.8 among the ideologically moderate participants!
This change is even more significant than the pure policy treatment in the previous study
(about 10% in Simonovits (2017)).ix This result also suggests that the moderate voters will
have an extremeness aversion tendency toward the new extreme candidate, and consider
the moderate counterpart as much more moderate.

Meanwhile, the effect of Ext-Con on the perceived Mod-Lib candidate is trivial.
In comparison, the impact of the entrance of Ext-Lib is not that clear on the full sample. If
we narrow our focus to the moderate participants, the estimated effect of Ext-Lib becomes
significant (+10.07, p < 0.1). Apart from the treatment effect, our regression models
provide little help on improving the precision of our estimation; comparing model 5 and 6
implies that the standard error of the uncontrolled models do not reduce significantly,
which suggests that the randomization process does not fail.
Most importantly, the effects of the two treatments are both asymmetric; the
entrance of the extreme liberal candidate only influences participants’ attitude toward the
moderate liberal one, and the entrance of the extreme conservative candidate only
influences the participants’ perception toward the moderate conservative counterpart. This
asymmetry is consistent with range theory owing to the two-end-point assumption.
Moreover, the policy statements of the two moderate candidates remain the same in the
control and treatment group; that is, voters change their perception on the moderate
candidate simply because of the entrance of the extreme candidate. Our experimental
design helps clarify the causal relationship.
The limited finding for the entrance of Ext-Lib may owe to three reasons. First, our
treatment was imperfect. The median value of the perceived Ext-Lib candidate position is
17 in Figure 1, which is not far from the Mod-Lib. In other words, our treatment is not the
most extremely liberal candidate in the eye of our opted-in participants. The extreme and
moderate policy statements we used are from the pilot survey among political science
undergraduate students. It can be possible that undergraduate students and MTurkers use
different standards for evaluating the extremeness of particular policies. A pre-test on the

MTurker should have detected this problem. Second, because the majority of our subjects
lean towards liberal views, it can be possible that they already know the moderate and
extreme candidates are on their side of the political spectrum too well. Therefore, our
treatment partially fails to create a new endpoint in their mind. Third, many important
policy issues include multiple facets. Our definition of liberal and conservative may be
different from our subjects to some extent (Feldman and Johnston 2014). Therefore, many
people do not perceive the extreme liberal treatment as we expected.
Next, we provide the cross-table between treatment group and voter’s self-placed
position on the liberal-conservative spectrum. The cross-table is used to examine the
extremeness aversion phenomenon. The cut-points for ideological groups are 40 and 60,
same as the previous analysis. In each cell, the first value is the percentage of votes that
the Mod-Lib candidate received, the second is how much the Mod-Con candidate received,
while the third value is what the extreme candidate in each treatment group received.
Table 4 provides some support to the extremeness aversion theory. Among the
conservative subjects, the entrance of Ext-Con lowers their support to the moderate
conservative candidate from 88% to 73%; the effect of Ext-Lib on Mod-Lib is even larger:
from 100% to 37%. It is not surprising that the entrance of radical candidate will split the
votes from its moderate counterpart among the voters on the same side.
When it comes to moderate subjects, the entrance of Ext-Con increases moderate
voter’s support to the Mod-Con candidate (from 27 % to 30%, the colored cell in Table 4),
but decreases their support toward the Mod-Lib (from 73% to 68%). To some extent, The
change is good news to Mod-Con candidate - the extremeness aversion effect helps ModCon narrow the relative strength of Mod-Lib among the moderate voters. However, the

change did not appear in the full sample, which may be because the number of moderate
voters in our sample is not enough (20.7%).

[Table 4]

Meanwhile, the entrance of Ext-Lib does not help the Mod-Lib nor the Mod-Con
candidate in our research design. Instead, the majority of our participants choose to vote
for the Ext-Lib in the treatment group. This failure may be attributed to the failed treatment
as is shown in Figure 1. Besides, it can also be the case that all candidates were designed
to graduate from a law school located in the southern part of United States. Graduating
from a southern university may imply its possibly right-wing position. Another possibility
may be from the multidimensionality of the ideology in the U.S. context. Therefore, even
though the entrance of extreme candidate may successfully influence voter’s perception of
the moderate candidate, as is evidenced in Table 3, their vote choice is worth further
exploring.
Study 2: TW Sample and Independence-Unification Spectrum
One weakness in our U.S. experiment is the imperfect treatment which was not
strong enough to serve as an "extreme candidate." Indeed, the policy statements used in
treatment may have multiple facets, so subject may be framed or may put different weights
on each facet. To deal with the issue complexity, we replicated the same experiment in
Taiwan, where the independence-unification issue is the only dominant dimension. Under
this particular context, we expect to find more unambiguous evidence on range effect in
the political arena. Before the analysis, the randomization is checked through ANOVA, as

was applied in the study 1. To improve the precision of the estimated ATE, we also use
Tobit regression to adjust for covariates.
Figure 2 shows how Taiwanese subjects in each group locate the two or three
candidates’ cross-strait attitudes. The distribution of the two extreme candidate evidence
that our manipulations are both effective: the extreme pro-independence candidate from
TSU was scored 95.5 as its median, while in the Treatment group B, the extreme prounification NP candidate was scored 3.

[Figure 2]

Once again, Figure 2 illustrates the range effect under the context of Taiwan politics.
Comparing the control group in the first row and the Treatment group A, Taiwanese
subjects’ perceived policy position of the moderate pro-independence candidate shifted
from 71.5 to 65, which is more moderate. Two sample t-test shows that the change in means
is significant (p < 0.001). Meanwhile, the subject’s perceived policy position of the
moderate pro-unification candidate remains unchanged (from 31.5 to 30, p = 0.51). The
exact same phenomenon can be found when comparing the control and Treatment group
B. The entrance of the extreme pro-unification candidate makes subjects’ attitudes toward
the moderate one on the same side to be much more moderate (from 31.5 to 38). Two
sample t-test shows that the shift is statistically significant (p < 0.001). At the same time,
subjects’ attitudes toward the moderate pro-independence candidate remain unchanged
(from 71.5 to 74, p = 0.92). The result in Figure 2 indicates that the range effect exists in
democracy across cultures.

Tobit regression model then is used to estimate the ATE of the Treatment A and B
and adjust for covariates (including age, gender, income, level of education, and self-report
policy preference before the treatment). Demeaned covariates and their interaction with the
two treatments are added to the models. In Table 5, the first two regression models are
subjects’ perceived policy position on the moderate pro-independence DPP candidate
(Mod-Ind), while the third and fourth regressions are for the moderate pro-unification
KMT candidate (Mod-Uni).
Results in Table 5 are consistent with Figure 2 and the predictions of range effect
theory. First, the entrance of the extreme pro-independence Ext-Ind TSU candidate make
voters view the Mod-Ind candidate as more moderate, but the null effect is found on the
Mod-Uni candidate who is on the opposite side of the policy spectrum. Similarly, the
entrance of the Ext-Uni NP candidate only makes the Mod-Uni candidate as more
moderate, but no effect is found on Mod-Ind. The entry of the extreme candidate
asymmetrically influences the image of the moderate candidate on the same side, but not
the moderate one on the opposite side, which is predicted by range effect theory. Moreover,
the policy statements of the two moderate candidates remain the same in control and
treatment group; that is, voters change their perception of the moderate candidate because
of the entrance of the extreme counterpart. What’s more, in the second and fourth model,
covariate adjustment provides little help to improve the estimation of ATE.x

[Table 5]

Table 6 shows Taiwanese subjects’ vote choices under different treatment groups.
The ideological group is defined by the median value of the perceived moderate candidate

in the control group: 31.5 and 71.5.xi In each cell, the first value is the percentage of votes
that Mod-Uni candidate received, the second is what Mod-Ind candidate received, while
the one in the parentheses is what the extreme candidate received.

[Table 6]

Results in the column of moderate respondents partially support range effect theory.
When Ext-Ind candidate was in, the percentage of moderate voters supporting the ModInd candidate increased from 58% to 64% (p=0.08). Unfortunately, the similar effect is
not found in Treatment group B. The null finding in Treatment group B may be because
that among the moderate subjects we defined, 62% of them placed their position larger than
50. Thus, even though they perceived that Mod-Uni candidate becomes more moderate
when an Ext-Uni candidate joins the race, the change is not enough to attract them. Third,
the entrance of Ext-Ind candidate seriously drew the vote share of a Mod-Ind candidate
from 91% to 46% among the pro-independence voters, and Ext-Uni candidate makes the
vote share of Mod-Uni KMT candidate slump from 100% to one-third. Comparing the
results among all Taiwanese voters between the Control group and Treatment A, it shows
that the moderate pro-independence candidate lost a lot among the pro-independence
supporters, but he also gained some from the moderate voters, which still ensures his
winning and meanwhile further marginalizes his main competitor, the moderate prounification candidate (whose support rate dropped from 23% to 12%).
The Motivation of the Mainstream Party: A simulation
In the two experiments, one of our primary weaknesses is that the number of voters
in each cell in Table 4 and 6 is very low and skewed, which prevents us from further

inference. However, through Tobit analysis in Table 3 and 5, we showed that the entrance
of extreme candidate could asymmetrically influence voters’ perception of the moderate
candidate on the same side. Thus, we should expect to find evidence that the major party
will be motivated to allow the entrance of a radical party if we extend the range effect to
the whole population. To illustrate the motivation of the major party (such as DPP’s
willingness to share some seats and votes to the small parties), we combine the clearer
result from Taiwanese subjects in Figure 2 (perceived candidate positions), and the
proximity voting assumption to simulate the mainstream party’s calculation.
In the beginning, voters are assumed to be uniformly distributed in the unificationindependence dimension. Second, the two median values of perceived Mod-Ind and ModUni candidate’s position in the first row of Figure 2 (the control group), 31.5 and 71.5,
serve as cutting points separating pro-unification, moderate, and pro-independence voters.
Third, we simulate the number of moderate voters from 0% to 100%, and the number of
pro-unification and pro-independence voters are proportional to the lengths. We assume
that all voters follow the proximity paradigm, indicating that they will vote for the
candidate closer to them in the policy spectrum (Tomz and Van Houweling 2008). For
example, when all voters are moderate voters, the Mod-Ind candidate can gain 50% of
votes; when no voter is moderate, the Mod-Ind candidate can gain all votes on the right
side of her, indicating100% ×

100−71.5
100−71.5+31.5

= 47.5%.

When the Ext-Ind candidate chooses to join the competition, we use the result in
the second row of Figure 2 to estimate the change of vote share among all candidates. In
particular, the focus is on how the entrance of Ext-Ind influences the vote share of Mod-

Ind, the moderate candidate on the same side of the political spectrum, under different
numbers of moderate voters.
Figure 3 shows the simulation of Mod-Ind candidate’s vote share under different
numbers of moderate voters in the district, based on the result of Figure 2 and the
assumption of proximity voting. When there is no Ext-Ind candidate, the Mod-Ind
candidate can earn 47.5% to 50% of the vote-- she can, at most, tie the election and may
lose to Mod-Uni candidate in most possible scenarios. However, when the Ext-Ind
candidate jumps into the election, the Mod-Ind candidate will be perceived as much more
moderate, and she can earn more votes from the moderate voters. In this simulation, when
the number of moderate voters exceeds 82%, the Mod-Ind candidate has the motivation to
allow the Ext-Ind candidate running in the election strategically. When almost all voters
are moderate, the Mod-Ind candidate can gain 56% of votes after Ext-Ind candidate
emerged.

[Figure 3]

This simulation of the mainstream party’s calculation helps us to explain strategic
choices of the mainstream party in real elections. According to the long-term survey
conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in Taiwan,xii in
2015 there are only 4.3% of Taiwanese people seeking immediate independence and 1.5%
supporting immediate unification. In contrast, 85.4% of Taiwanese wants to maintain status
quo, at least in the short run.xiii If we merely assume who prefers the status quo as being
moderate voters, the distribution of Taiwanese voters on the unification-independence
spectrum provides enough motivation for the major party to allow the entrance of its

extreme counterpart strategically. Therefore, our result may help rationalize DPP’s strategy
in the 2012 and 2016 elections, in which they cooperated with extreme pro-independence
parties.

Conclusion and Discussion
Results in our survey experiments in both the United States and Taiwan suggest
that range effect exists when people are interpreting political information and making
voting decisions, especially in the SMD elections. Once an extreme candidate enters the
electoral battleground, voters would subjectively relocate the perceived policy position of
the moderate candidate on the same side of the political spectrum to a more moderate
position. In the two survey experiments, the two moderate candidates have the same policy
manifesto in the control and treatment groups, which rules out the alternative explanation
that the moderate candidate actively moves their policy position to attract moderate voters
and to prevent the emergence of the extreme parties. Moreover, we find that subject’s
perception of the moderate candidate on the opposite side remains unchanged, which
implies that voters indeed change their perception to the intermediate option rather than
change the way they scale every option. The asymmetric impact supports the two-endpoint
model used in the range effect theory and is consistent with the recent studies in political
science with different political settings.
The range effect has important implications for the study of political behavior. First
of all, our results consolidate the psychological foundation for our argument on the
mainstream party’s strategy. In the last part of the previous section, we provide simulation
based on experiment result to show that the major party has the motivation to strategically
allow its extreme counterpart to run in the election, especially when the number of

moderate voters is large enough. The mainstream party (or the moderate major candidate)
can strategically foster or repress its radical counterpart running in the election in order to
change its own perceived policy position, even without changing its policy platform. It is
costly for a party to shift policy positions on major issues because it may be perceived as
inconsistent or even dishonest (Tavits 2007); changing policy may also be harmful to intraparty politics. xiv However, by manipulating the range effect, the mainstream party can
apparently make itself seem closer to the moderate median point on the ideological
spectrum by doing nothing; that is, by not blocking radical candidates. In this scenario, the
radical wing competitor is not a drag but becomes part of the strategy for the mainstream
candidate to win the election. The case of Taiwan politics between 2012 and 2016 may
serve as an example. Our result may also help explain Ezrow et al. (2014)’s finding. They
analyzed the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems datasets from 1996 to 2007 and
found that the moderate parties gained more when there were extreme competitors among
established democracies.xv
Second, the range effect and the contextual-dependent preference challenge the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption implicitly acknowledged in the
spatial models and multinomial regression models. If the entrance of the extreme candidate
changes people’s perception of the existing moderate options, this phenomenon suggests
that people’s perception of the available options are endogenous to each other. If people
do change their perceived utility as well as the choice between two options with and
without the existence of the third option, the transitivity assumption may be questionable,
and the Pareto optimum can hardly be defined. Similarly, the IIA assumption can be tested
through a variety of statistic tools. However, if people’s perceptions of the option would

be substantively changed after some other options were dropped, this shift may not be
recorded in the dataset. In other words, the possibility of fulfilling IIA assumption may be
overestimated.
Third, ironically, the range effect is, to some extent, beneficial to the function of
democracy. The emergence of radical wing parties may indeed reflect the voice of extreme
supporters, but the existence of such extreme options also indirectly makes the mainstream
party more popular among the moderate voters. Therefore, the mainstream party would
have more bargaining power through election results to rebalance the potential influence
of the radical wing parties. Also, it may help explain why holding the primary may help
the party’s chance of winning the general election (Adams et al. 2008). Adams and his
colleagues suggest that the primary improves the campaign skills of the candidates, while
our study suggests that the competition between the extreme and moderate nominees can
make the moderate one more attractive to the moderate voters, which would be vital to
winning the general election.
Fourth, our study also contributes to the study of consumer psychology. Our two
experiments reveal a clear tendency of range effect – the extreme counterpart will influence
people's judgment on the moderate candidate. However, the effect of the extremeness
aversion – that is, people will avoid the extreme option – is not very clear in the vote
choices (Table 4 and 6). The reason behind this weak finding is simple: some voters are
also ideologically extreme. Therefore, they need not avoid the extreme candidate. In other
words, whether the extremeness aversion will appear is determined by the interplay
between the characteristics of the options and the consumers.

The next step of this research project can be fivefold. First, we aim at collecting
samples from representative pools of subjects so that we could examine if the same range
effect also exists among the public. Second, our experimental design did not fit the (closed)
primary election in the United States and only explore one possible direction that the
entrance of the extreme candidate may influence voters’ perception.
Third, in our survey experiment, we simplify the treatment by adding only one
politically extreme party in SMD. What would happen if there were both the extreme left
and extreme right-wing candidates entering into the election? Waismel-Manor and
Simonovits (2017) had tested the range effect in the setting of PR with multiple candidates.
We will try to build up models and arguments for such complexity. Fourth, as is suggested
by Feldman and Johnston (2014), the number of dimensions in the U.S. public may be two
rather than one. Even though we merely focused on the major left-right spectrum which
dominates the politicians in the U.S. and the independence-unification spectrum that
dominates in the Taiwan politics, it would be theoretically interesting to explore the effect
of the newly emerged salient issues in or out of the existing spectrum, or the effect of a
single-issue candidate’s entrance. For instance, if the entrance of the new candidate only
cares one issue, such as gun control or nuclear plant, would he or she still influence the
moderate counterpart on the same side?
In the end, does the range effect exist in the real political world? In this article, we
have provided Taiwan 2012 and 2016 presidential election as an introductory case. To
further examine this possibility, we need to find out and trace the districts across elections
that a radical candidate ran in past elections, while the policies announced by the major
competitors remained unchanged. Surveying voters’ perception of the candidates in the

two different elections may also be necessary. The search and combination of datasets
require additional workload, and that is the next step of our project on studying the range
effect in politics.
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An extreme party does not create new issue dimensions, but it locates itself at an extreme
position on the existing ideological or issue spectrum. A niche party, which creates a new
issue dimension, can be ignored by dismissive strategies of the main party.
iii

Indeed, there are distinctions between proximity voting, directional voting, and

discounting voting. However, Tomz and Van Houweling (2008) analyze data from 20
countries and survey experiment considering healthcare policy in the U.S., and show that
proximity voting still dominates voting behavior regardless of educational level,
partisanship, and ideology.
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The results of OLS estimation can be found in the supplemental material file.
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The 40-60 range was not chosen arbitrarily. First, we intuitively believed those who

located themselves between 40 and 60 should be moderate, which are not far from the
middle point 50. Second, the histogram of the MTurkers’ self-reported ideology reveals

two peaks at 0-20 and 40-60, respectively. Third, the range includes enough number of
subjects (n=105, also see footnote 10) for the regression analysis in Table 3 and contingent
table analysis in Table 4. Fourth, the main result in Table 3 did not change if we applied a
different definition of moderate. For example, if the range is redefined as 42-58 (n=92),
the effect size of Ext-Lib in the model 3 in Table 3 will become 12.75 (p<0.05). If 38-62
(n=144), the effect size will become 7.43 (p < 0.1). We really appreciate Reviewer 2 for
asking for the clarification.
ix

Regarding the effect size and the required sample size, since the average treatment effect

is about 7.3 points, and the pooled standard deviation for the moderate conservative
candidates is 18.3, 99.6 subjects in each group are needed to reach the 80% power, and 133
are needed for 90% power. If we have taken into account for the 10 point effect size in the
previous study (Simonovits 2017), the number of subject needed to reach 80% and 90%
power should be 53.5 and 71.3, respectively. Therefore, the number of subject collected in
the U.S. sample (n=100 in the treatment group) is not unsatisfied.
x

Once again, the ATE shown in Table 5 mitigates the threat of power. The two treatment

effects are about 7.5 points, and the pooled standard deviation for the moderate candidates
are 15.6 for DPP and 16.0 for KMT. Therefore, 68.9 and 91.2 subjects are needed to reach
80% and 90% power, both of which are smaller than the number assigned to the treatment
groups (110 for Ext-Ind and 119 for Ext-Uni, respectively).
xi

The definition of moderates, 40-60 used in the US case, cannot be applied here. The

range will leave two few sample for analysis (n=48). When the 31.5-71.5 is applied, the
number of moderate voters becomes 107, which is very close to the number in the US case
and fits minimum requirement for power analysis (see footnote 8) and the contingency

table analysis in Table 6. Therefore, we deliberatively chose two different ranges for the
two studies, partly driven by the data and theirs limitations.
xii

xiii

http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167. Search Date: May 7, 2016.
34.0% “Maintain status quo, decide at later date”; 25.4% “Maintain status quo

indefinitely; 17.9% “Maintain status quo, move toward independence”; 8.1% “Maintain
status quo, move toward unification”
xiv

It is possible that partisan voters may update their own policy position to follow their

long-attached party. However, based on the study of the European politics, Adam et al.
(2008) found that people did not systematically follow the policy change of their attached
party, nor did they adjust their loyalty. Instead, they only systematically update their
subjective perceptions among the parties.
xv

However, the opposite effect is found among new democracies because mainstream

parties have not occupied a certain policy position on the spectrum.
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Table 1: Socio-Demographics of MTurk Subjects
Variable
N
Mean St. Dev.
Age
509 37.51 11.18
Male
509 0.54
0.50
Yearly Income (1=20K, 6=250K (in USD))
508 2.42
0.93
Edu (1=High school, 7=PhD)
509 4.22
1.22
Black
509 0.08
0.27
Importance of Religion Life
505 1.99
1.35
Self-Reported Liberal-Conservative Position (0-100) 508 38.45 28.19

Min
18
0
1
1
0
1
0

Max
74
1
5
7
1
5
100

Table 2: Socio-Demographics of PTT Subjects
Variable
N
Mean St. Dev.
Age
426 23.57 4.92
Female
427 0.46
0.50
Monthly Income (1=20K, 5=150K (in NTD))
426 2.42
1.04
Edu (1=High school, 7=PhD)
426 3.24
0.48
Self-Reported Uni-Ind Position (0-100)
427 78.61 20.54

Min
18
0
1
2
0

Max
54
1
5
4
100

Table 3: Tobit Models on Candidates’ Perceived Liberal-Conservative Position

Ext-Con running
Ext-Lib running
Demographics ×
Treatments
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Ward Test
Note:

Dependent Variable:
View on Mod-Lib
View on Mod-Con
Full
Full
Moderate Full
Full
Moderate
***
***
-1.875
-2.773
4.040
-7.181
-7.274
-19.031***
(2.235)
(2.214)
(5.717)
(2.314)
(2.331)
(4.891)
0.665
0.742
9.979*
1.247
1.137
-6.318
(2.226)
(2.196)
(5.892)
(2.315)
(2.327)
(5.052)
YES
YES
YES
YES
24.202*** 24.443*** 23.519***
(1.806)
(1.796)
(4.699)
484
481
96
-2025
-1993
-409.4
1.968
30.19
16.99
(df=2)
(df=20)
(df=20)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

78.866***
(1.879)
488
-2055
21.43
(df=2)

79.131***
(1.905)
485
-2029
34.91
(df=20)

80.645***
(4.029)
97
-395.4
39.12
(df=20)

Table 4: Vote Choice among Treatment Groups and Voter’s self-placement
Voter Type
Liberal (<40)
Moderate(40-60)
Conservative(>60) All
Vote Choice
Lib, Con, Ext
Lib, Con, Ext
Lib, Con, Ext
Lib, Con, Ext
Control
100%, 0%
73%, 27%
12%, 88%
71%, 29%
Group A: Ext-Con 96%, 0%, 4%
68%, 30%, 3%
10%, 73%, 17%
69%, 27%, 5%
Group B: Ext-Lib 37%, 2%, 62%
29%, 31%, 40%
4%, 83%, 13%
27%, 27%, 46%

Table 5: Tobit Models on Candidates’ Perceived Unification-Independence Position

Variable

Ext-Ind running
Ext-Uni running
Demographics ×
Treatments
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Ward Test
Note:

Dependent Variable:
View on Mod-Ind
(1)
(2)
-7.440**
-7.575**
(2.082)
(1.996)
-0.462
-1.170
(2.044)
(1.971)
YES
72.455**
72.626**
(1.387)
(1.353)
368
366
-1480
-1488
15.191**
67.186**
(df=2)
(df=17)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01

View on Mod-Uni
(3)
(4)
2.452
2.802
(2.072)
(1.984)
7.914**
9.284**
(2.025)
(1.949)
YES
30.288**
(1.369)
372
-1524
15.660**
(df=2)

29.759**
(1.324)
370
-1495
62.321**
(df=17)

Table 6: Vote Choice among Treatment Groups and Voter’s self-placement
Pro-Uni
Moderate
Pro-Ind
All
Uni, Ind, Ext
Uni, Ind, Ext
Uni, Ind, Ext
Uni, Ind, Ext
Control
100%, 0%
42%, 58%
9%, 91%
23%, 77%
Group A: Ext-Ind 100%, 0%, 0%
27%, 64%, 9%
6%, 46%, 48%
12%, 50%, 38%
Group B: Ext-Uni 33%, 33%, 33%
42%, 55%, 3%
14%, 84%, 2%
20%,77 %, 3%
Voter Type

Figure 1. Median and Density Plots of Perceived Candidate Positions, Study 1

Figure 2. Median and Density Plots of Perceived Candidate Positions, Study 2

Figure 3. Number of Moderate voters motivates Major party’s strategy

